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Implementing Congestion Pricing on Metropolitan 
Highway Networks with Self-Financing 
Public-Private Partnerships
This paper presents a new public-private partnership model for road pricing applications either at 
the facility level or on a region-wide highway network.  The model addresses issues of monopoly 
power and efficiency of delivery of transportation services.  The paper also addresses issues relating 
to financial self-sufficiency of integrated multimodal pricing strategies and assesses the financial 
self-sufficiency of an ambitious region-wide pricing concept that integrates multimodal mobility 
choices.  
by Patrick DeCorla-Souza
INTRODUCTION
Roadway congestion pricing includes a 
group of market-based strategies that involve 
collecting a variable toll for highway use, with 
the primary intent of managing travel demand 
so as to reduce or eliminate congestion on a 
roadway facility, corridor, or network.  In the 
United States, pricing has been implemented 
in two types of situations.  First, priced lanes 
have been created on existing toll-free facilities 
by converting High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) 
lanes to High-Occupancy/ Toll (HOT) lanes, or 
by adding new lanes.  Second, variable charges 
have been introduced on existing toll facilities 
that previously charged flat tolls.  In 2004, eight 
pricing projects were in operation in the United 
States, four in each category (U.S. Department 
of Transportation 2004), and a ninth project 
was implemented in May 2005 in Minneapolis, 
MN, on I-394.
Proposals have been made to extend these 
pricing concepts to region-wide systems of 
priced freeways or priced freeway lanes that 
would maintain free-flowing traffic conditions 
throughout the network, thus providing a 
running way that allows introduction of high 
quality express bus or Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) 
services.  A proposal by the Reason Foundation 
(Poole and Orski 2003) would create a network 
of priced lanes on existing toll-free roads, using 
existing HOV lanes and adding new lanes on 
segments where no HOV lanes exist. Free 
service would be provided only to authorized 
buses and/or vanpools.  BRT would operate on 
the priced HOV lanes. Another region-wide road 
pricing concept, called “Fast and Intertwined 
Regular” highways or FAIR highways, would 
convert all lanes on existing freeways to variably 
priced lanes, exempt HOVs from payment of 
tolls, provide discounted tolls for low-income 
motorists, and use surplus toll revenue to fund 
new express bus services and implement traffic 
flow improvements on parallel arterial facilities 
(DeCorla-Souza 2005). 
Pricing provides two key benefits for transit 
services.  First, by managing traffic demand on 
a single lane or multiple lanes to ensure free 
flow of traffic, pricing provides a busway-like 
facility for operation of express bus or BRT 
services.  Second, pricing generates a new 
revenue stream from tolls which may be used 
to support transit service operations, purchase 
buses, or construct bus stations and park-and-
ride facilities. 
Express bus or BRT services increase the 
technical and political feasibility of pricing 
in two key ways. First, the effectiveness of 
pricing strategies increases when travelers have 
available to them a viable alternative mode that 
they can choose if they wish to avoid paying the 
toll.  With new express bus or BRT services on 
priced highways, vehicular travel demand can 
be reduced without resorting to high toll rates to 
ensure that traffic volumes do not exceed critical 
levels at which the free flow of traffic breaks 
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down.  Commuters benefit from lower toll rates 
for those motorists who continue to drive, and 
better transit service for those who choose it. 
Second, by keeping toll rates affordable and, 
by providing a viable alternative for those who 
may not be able to afford the toll, express bus 
service ensures that equity is preserved for 
those commuters who are less able to afford 
tolls.  Addressing equity concerns is key for 
public and political acceptance of road pricing 
strategies.
The objective of this paper is to present a 
new public-private partnership (PPP) approach 
for road pricing applications that could 
maximize efficient delivery of highway, transit, 
and ridesharing services in metropolitan areas, 
while addressing issues relating to monopoly 
power.  Because financial feasibility is key to 
successfully moving forward with a PPP, the 
paper assesses, at a sketch level, the financial 
self-sufficiency of an ambitious region-wide 
approach to enhance multimodal metropolitan 
mobility using roadway pricing in the short-
term and long-term.  
In the next section, the paper briefly 
discusses the benefits of PPPs and monopoly 
power and financial feasibility issues with 
regard to operating projects as well as proposed 
networks of priced facilities in metropolitan 
areas.  The following section discusses an 
approach to address monopoly power issues 
relating to private provision of roads and 
illustrates it using a prototypical case.  This 
is followed by a discussion of ways in which 
the approach may also be applied to deliver 
complementary transit and ridesharing services. 
The paper then presents a pricing concept 
that could address financial feasibility issues 
relating to networks of priced facilities, while 
at the same time addressing financing needs 
for multimodal transportation services. This is 
supported by a sketch-level analysis of revenues 
and costs to assess the financial self-sufficiency 
of the concept in a typical large metropolitan 
area, both in the short-term and the long-term.
 
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS - 
BENEFITS AND ISSUES
In an era of scarce public resources, tolls bring 
new revenue.  The promise of a steady stream 
of new revenue from tolls makes it possible 
to increase private sector involvement in the 
financing, implementation and operation of 
pricing projects for the mutual benefit of both 
the public and the private sectors.
Procuring transportation facilities and 
services through public-private partnerships 
(PPPs) has many advantages over the traditional 
publicly financed approach. Projects are generally 
designed and constructed more quickly and 
capital demands on the public treasury are 
reduced.  Advances in innovation as well as 
efficiency may be encouraged.  Federal, State, 
and local governments have shown increasing 
interest in private sector involvement in the 
provision of transportation infrastructure and 
services.  However, issues relating to monopoly 
power and financial feasibility will need to be 
addressed.  
Monopoly Power Issues.  Pursuit of PPP 
arrangements for roadway congestion pricing 
projects raises issues relating to private monopoly 
power. Efficient, free-flowing freeway traffic 
operation is absolutely essential to maintain the 
high quality of express bus or BRT operations 
on freeways.  This may occasionally require 
relatively high tolls to keep traffic free flowing 
during rush hours when travel demand is very 
high.  This may be perceived by the public 
as “price gouging,” and poses a problem, 
particularly if the extra revenue goes to the 
private sector partner.  The public may perceive 
that the private sector partner is attempting to 
maximize its profits through excessive peak 
charges.  There may be special concerns if a 
“non-compete” clause in the PPP agreement 
prevents the public agency from doing anything 
to relieve congestion on parallel free facilities. 
This occurred in Orange County, CA, where a 
“non-compete” clause in the PPP agreement for 
the priced express lanes in the median of SR 
91 prevented the public agency from making 
improvements on the adjacent free lanes 
(Sullivan 2000).  Simply eliminating or limiting 
non-compete provisions is not a solution 
because the private sector would be unwilling 
to invest in highway projects without adequate 
protection against future competition.
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Financial Feasibility Issues. The ability to 
finance integrated transit/pricing proposals 
entirely from toll revenue will be an important 
consideration in moving forward with private 
sector involvement. However, recently 
completed feasibility studies suggest that 
financial self-sufficiency may be difficult to 
achieve.  A feasibility study for a network of 
HOT lanes in the Twin Cities of Minnesota 
suggests that tolls could pay only 15% to 55% 
of the cost of building the lanes (Cambridge 
Systematics, Inc. and URS Corporation 2005). 
The consultant-recommended system would 
have a cost recovery ratio of 33%.  Parsons, 
Brinckerhoff, Quade and Douglas (2005) 
studied the feasibility of a HOT lane system in 
Atlanta. They found that as long as a policy is in 
place to restrict free service to transit vehicles 
and carpools with four or more persons, the 
tolls can cover 100% of the costs for technology 
investments associated with HOT lanes as well 
as operations and maintenance costs. However, 
the tolls would not cover the costs for building 
infrastructure such as new highway lanes. A 
nationwide study of the feasibility of networks 
of HOT lanes in eight metropolitan areas by 
Poole and Orski (2003) suggests that the eight 
region-wide BRT/HOT systems studied by them 
will not be financially self-sufficient, and transit 
system costs, other than “fixed guideway” 
costs (i.e., highway lane construction costs), 
would need to be supported entirely by fares 
and tax dollars.  Revenues generated would be 
inadequate to cover all of the capital costs for 
highway construction. Nor would they cover 
continuing maintenance, traffic management 
and toll operation costs.  The main reason is 
that, in addition to the high cost for adding 
lanes on segments where HOV lanes do not 
currently exist, providing special premium-
service lanes requires additional shoulders and 
barriers between HOT and free lanes, and direct 
access ramps to ensure safe conditions for entry 
to and exit from the lanes. 
ADDRESSING MONOPOLY POWER 
ISSUES 
To address monopoly power issues, a new PPP 
model is proposed called “Concurrent Regular 
and Shadow Tolling (CRAST).”  This approach 
would separate the system operator from the 
toll revenue beneficiary.  “Shadow” tolls would 
compensate the private partner. Shadow tolls 
are usage payments made by a third party. 
Real tolls would still be charged to road users 
concurrently, but all revenues from real tolls 
would go to the public partner. Although the 
private partner would set the toll rate to manage 
demand and ensure that traffic is free flowing 
(as on the express lanes on SR 91), all revenues 
would go to the public sector. The public agency 
would reimburse the private partner using a flat 
shadow toll rate for each vehicle served at free 
flow speeds. Because pro-active management 
of traffic flow with variable tolls is needed only 
during peak periods, shadow tolls would apply 
only for peak period traffic.  
Free flow speeds are critical to preserve the 
high quality of express bus service and offer 
travelers a viable alternative to driving and 
paying a toll. It also offers toll-paying motorists 
a fast and reliable trip in exchange for the 
tolls they pay.  Also, because of the nature of 
traffic flow on a congested freeway, the most 
economically efficient operation of a freeway 
is attained at free flow speeds.  Recent data 
on freeway operation in Southern California 
(Chen and Varaiya 2002) demonstrate that free-
flowing freeway traffic breaks down almost 
instantaneously and unpredictably with just a 
small increment of traffic volume when traffic 
volumes are in the range of 1,800 to 2,000 
vehicles per lane per hour. After traffic flow 
breaks down, the data show that traffic volumes 
carried on a severely congested freeway are 
reduced to about 1,300 vehicles per lane per 
hour at much lower speeds.  This suggests 
that managing traffic on a severely congested 
freeway with pricing could actually allow the 
freeway to handle more traffic than it did when 
traffic was unmanaged, and maintaining free-
flowing traffic conditions is optimal from both 
engineering as well as an economic efficiency 
perspectives.  
Under the CRAST model, potential private 
partners would compete based on the shadow 
toll rate per vehicle that they are willing to 
accept as compensation for their infrastructure 
investments and highway maintenance, 
operations and toll collection services. 
Agreements with the private partner would need 
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to include performance standards (e.g., safety, 
public information, highway signage, billing, 
customer service centers, etc.), because the 
private partner may not gain additional revenue 
if quality of service to the public is reduced. The 
CRAST model will reduce revenue risk to the 
private partner while managing public cost risk, 
and could lead to more efficient and effective 
transportation service delivery.
Cost risk. Cost risk includes uncertainty of 
implementation costs, including costs for 
the innovative technology and operations 
approaches that will be needed for traffic 
management and toll collection.  Costs for major 
transportation projects often appear to spiral out 
of control after they have been approved. With 
the CRAST model, the public sector would 
know in advance its maximum cost liability, 
calculated as the maximum possible vehicle 
throughput per hour, times the number of peak 
hours of pricing operations, times the shadow 
toll per vehicle negotiated with the private 
partner. To reduce risk associated with reliance 
on toll revenue, the public partner could prepare 
a financial plan that allocates future receipts 
from its normal transportation funding sources 
to pay for contractual obligations to the private 
partner.    
Revenue risk.  Risk with regard to the stream of 
future revenue from user-paid tolls will be borne 
by the public sector. The private partner would 
be assured of an almost guaranteed stream of 
revenue based on the negotiated shadow toll 
rate.  This would reduce revenue forecast risk-
related costs and therefore lower the interest 
rates demanded by potential bondholders. 
Also, by having the flexibility to reduce the 
user-paid toll rates, the private partner would 
have the ability to counter-act the potential 
demand-reducing effects of competition from 
improvements that may be made to parallel 
highway facilities or competing transit or HOV 
services. In congested metropolitan areas, priced 
lanes could be filled to their critical free-flow 
capacity threshold levels simply by lowering the 
user-paid toll rate, thus ensuring that the private 
partner maximizes its shadow toll revenue. 
Consequently, total payments to the private 
partner would not be affected by improvements 
made to competing modes and routes. There 
would be no need in the PPP agreement for a 
non-compete clause such as the one that led to 
the termination of the PPP for the express lanes 
on SR 91 in Orange County, CA.  If the public 
partner were to choose to improve alternative 
routes or modes in the travel corridor, it would 
absorb all the revenue risks due to its actions, 
because it is the recipient of user-paid toll 
revenues. Thus, the entity best able to manage 
risk from competition is the entity that bears the 
risk of loss of revenue that could result from 
that competition. 
Service delivery. As experience with rate 
regulation has demonstrated, to maximize its 
profit the private partner would strive to keep 
costs down through innovation and would 
use efficient procurement and management 
practices. The private partner would attempt to 
maximize volume of traffic throughput with an 
acceptable probability of breakdown in traffic 
flow, because of the incentive to maximize 
vehicle throughput while ensuring that all traffic 
moves at free flow speeds. Because the private 
partner would only be paid for vehicles that are 
provided with free-flowing premium service, 
there would be an incentive to ensure that traffic 
flow does not break down. There would be no 
incentive for the private operator to keep toll 
rates high simply to maximize revenue. Higher 
charges than those needed to manage traffic 
result in unnecessary mobility losses, because 
motorists are dissuaded from traveling or are 
shifted to alternative routes or times of the day 
while highway capacity goes underused.  If 
traffic disruptions occur (e.g., due to incidents 
or road repairs), the private partner would be at 
risk of losing shadow toll revenue and it would 
have an incentive to clear them quickly.  The 
private partner would also have an incentive to 
produce innovative solutions to reduce the risk 
of incidents and accidents, and to reduce the 
impact of incidents, accidents and maintenance 
activities on traffic flow during rush hours.  
To illustrate the way in which the CRAST 
model would work, Table 1 presents financial 
estimates for a prototypical HOT facility 
similar to the priced express lanes operating in 
the median of SR 91 in Orange County, CA. 
To maximize public mobility in both peak and 
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off-peak hours, it is assumed in this example 
that tolls would only be charged during peak 
travel periods on weekdays when adjacent 
lanes are congested. Annualized cost estimates 
are based on cost data for the 91 express lanes 
(Orange County Transportation Authority 2004). 
A discount rate of 7% over a 30-year life was 
used to annualize capital costs, in order to 
reflect the expected rate of return for private 
sector investments.
The analysis demonstrates that, as toll 
rates increase in the future (because of higher 
demand when adjacent lanes get more severely 
congested), the CRAST model will ensure that 
the significant increase in revenue will stay 
with the public agency. The private partner will 
receive a justifiable bonus if it achieves free-
flowing traffic conditions more often than the 
90 percent success rate assumed in calculating 
the shadow toll rate. It will receive a relatively 
Current Future
Peak period toll revenue estimation
Number of Lanes 4 4
Tolled traffic volume per lane 1,300 1,300
Free traffic volume per lane (buses and HOVs) 200 200
Number of hours lanes are tolled 6 8
Max. daily tolled traffic volume 31,200 41,600
Max. annual tolled traffic volume (250 days) 7,800,00 10,400,000
Average toll $4.00 $6.00
Max. annual toll revenue (million $) $31.20 $62.40
Net change in revenue to public agency (million $) $31.20
Cost estimation
Annualized capital cost (million $) $20.00 $20.00
Max. annual tolled traffic volume 7,800,000 10,400,000
Annual toll-free traffic volume (HOVs and buses) 1,200,000 1,600,000
Max. annual total traffic volume in peak periods 9,000,000 12,000,000
Estimated O & M cost per peak period vehicle $0.50 $0.50
Annual O & M cost (million $) $4.50 $6.00
Total annualized cost (million $) $24.50 $26.00
Shadow toll estimation
Max annual traffic volume 9,000,000 12,000,000
Assumed probability that traffic will be at free flow 0.9 0.9
Probable annual “shadow tolled” traffic volume 8,100,000 10,800,000
Estimated bid price for shadow toll $3.02 $2.41
Probable shadow toll revenue (million $) $24.50 $26.00
Max potential shadow toll revenue (million $) $27.22 $28.89
Max potential revenue increase (million $) $2.72 $2.89
Table 1: Application of the CRAST Model
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small increase in revenue (and potential bonus) 
with higher congestion levels in the future, 
commensurate with the increase in the number 
of vehicles served. Note that tolling operations 
will need to be expanded to more hours in the 
future, because as congestion increases it is 
likely that the regular lanes of the facility will 
be congested for a longer period of the day.  As 
the table suggests, shadow toll rates negotiated 
with the private partner will need to be based 
on a sliding scale tied to the number of hours of 
tolling operations needed.  
PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS FOR 
COMPLEMENTARY TRANSIT AND 
HOV SERVICES 
A PPP arrangement similar to the CRAST 
concept described above may be used to 
compensate private providers for new transit 
or HOV services to complement highway 
pricing.  For transit, the private partner would 
be compensated by the public partner with 
a two-part tariff – a base service fee plus a 
transit usage payment (TUP) for each transit 
trip served above a base usage level.  This 
per-trip usage payment would make up for the 
difference between the fare and the marginal 
cost per trip for providing service above the 
base usage level.  With usage payments, the 
private partner stands to increase its revenues 
(and potentially profits) by encouraging the use 
of transit.  This would increase its incentive 
to promote transit and maximize resulting 
public benefits from reduced roadway usage 
during peak times.  Likewise, private partners 
could provide HOV services (e.g., rideshare 
matching and park-and-pool facilities) and be 
compensated on a per-trip basis with an HOV 
usage payment (HUP) for each HOV commuter 
above a base level.
HOV and transit usage payments to 
private partners may not be cost-efficient if 
they exceed the estimated value of external 
benefits, e.g., the decrease in external costs 
resulting from the reduction in solo driver 
trips. Therefore, it is important for the public 
agency to have the capability to estimate the 
value of changes in external costs resulting 
from an increase in transit or HOV mode share. 
External benefits may be estimated using the 
Transportation Research Board’s Guidebook to 
Estimate and Present Benefits and Disbenefits 
of Public Transit (ECONorthwest and Parsons, 
Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, Inc., 2003).  If 
the bid price from the private partner for usage 
payments (TUP or HUP) per trip is higher than 
the marginal external benefit, a PPP contract 
option for service above the base level may not 
be economically justified.
Minimum transit performance and safety 
service standards (e.g., service frequency, 
passenger load factors and vehicle condition) 
could be set by the public partner to ensure 
quality of service. Base service payments to 
be made to the private transit operator could 
be determined on the basis of the cost of the 
minimum required service level set by the 
public agency (less expected fare revenue), 
with adjustments allowed for fuel prices.  Usage 
payments for ridership above the specified base 
level of transit ridership could be based on 
automatic accounting, facilitated by requiring 
the use of electronic fare payment (e.g., using 
a smart card) for anyone wanting to get the 
subsidized fare.  
Carpools and vanpools are often perceived 
as competitors to transit, because the modes have 
many common characteristics. A private partner 
operating transit services would therefore be 
concerned about the risk of competition from 
any efforts to increase HOV use. To address 
this issue, the private partner operating transit 
services could also be under contract to run 
the HOV program. Periodic counts of HOV 
commuters may need to be made to assess the 
success of the private operator in increasing 
HOV use. Photographic systems employing 
near infra-red cameras have achieved some 
success in counting vehicle occupants, and have 
been shown to have some potential for further 
improvement and deployment (University of 
Minnesota Department of Computer Science 
1999). If toll discounts or exemptions were 
offered to HOVs, keeping track of the number 
of HOVs would be relatively easy — HOVs 
could be identified electronically, such as by 
passing through special lanes upon entry into 
the priced facilities to receive a toll exemption 
or discount. The public partner could set HOV 
toll discount or exemption policies, and the 
private operator of the priced lanes (who would 
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not necessarily be the same as the transit and 
HOV service operator) would not be concerned, 
because compensation will be provided by a 
shadow toll for every vehicle, whether it is a 
single-occupant vehicle, an HOV, or a transit 
vehicle. The proposed TUP and HUP models for 
transit and HOV service delivery could be more 
economically efficient than conventional service 
delivery, and could encourage innovation.
Economic efficiency. Private partners would 
have an incentive to promote transit use up to 
the point where the fare (a proxy for the transit 
rider’s benefit) and the usage payment per trip 
(a proxy for the external benefit) would be just 
equal to the marginal cost of providing service. 
Similarly, they would have an incentive to 
promote HOV use up to the point where the 
usage payment per HOV commuter trip (a 
proxy for the external benefit) would just 
equal the private partners’ marginal costs of 
promoting and providing HOV service.  Thus, 
economic efficiency and net social benefits 
would be maximized. If usage payment rates 
were set carefully, private partners would be in a 
position to seek the most socially cost-efficient 
mode (i.e., transit or HOV) with which to serve 
the commuter. Base transit service frequency 
requirements will ensure that the usage 
payment per HOV commuter does not provide 
an incentive to private partners to increase 
HOV use at the cost of transit ridership to such 
an extent that it results in a significant reduction 
in transit service frequency, thus compromising 
the quality of express bus service.   Also, the 
usage payment rate per HOV person trip would 
need to be lower than the transit fare that the 
transit operator would stand to lose if a transit 
rider shifts to HOV use.
Service effectiveness. The incentive to maximize 
transit ridership, if successful, could lead 
to more riders and therefore more frequent 
service. All transit riders would gain because 
any increase in service frequency will reduce 
their waiting time. Private partners would have 
an incentive to provide new premium services 
for those willing to pay a higher fare, e.g. door-
to-door limousine services (similar to airport 
shuttles) or vanpool services, provided that 
these services would still be eligible for usage 
payments from the public agency. Private 
partners would also have an incentive to work 
with transportation management associations to 
encourage employees to take transit or carpool. 
They might innovate with fare agreements with 
employers and building owners, provide new 
services and conveniences such as station cars 
and park- and-ride/pool lots, and marketing 
programs that encourage people to use other 
ways of traveling rather than driving alone in 
a car. Availability of parking spaces at park-
and-ride facilities is often the limiting factor 
for carpooling and transit use. Private partners 
would have an incentive to innovate with new 
parking arrangements for transit and HOV 
commuters.  
ADDRESSING FINANCIAL 
FEASIBILITY ISSUES
Could an entire region-wide pricing/express 
bus system be financially self-sufficient, 
without an infusion of tax dollars? In an 
attempt to address the financial deficit issues 
of the HOT system proposals discussed earlier, 
two ambitious pricing scenarios involving the 
“FAIR highways” concept were examined. 
FAIR highways involve pricing all freeway 
lanes. They may be more financially feasible 
than concepts that involve pricing only one 
or two lanes in each direction, because they 
would bring in more revenue, while avoiding 
extra infrastructure costs associated with 
providing premium-service lanes, such as costs 
for barriers, extra shoulders, and direct access 
ramps for entry to and exit from the special 
lanes. 
The first FAIR network scenario envisions 
an application of region-wide pricing on all lanes 
of the existing freeway system in the short-term 
(within five years) and therefore involves only 
minor modifications to the existing freeway 
system. Large new infrastructure investments 
are not envisioned under this scenario, and 
financing is therefore not a major concern. 
However, a private partner’s skills would still 
be invaluable for deployment of the complex 
schemes and innovative technologies that 
would be needed. Also, by shifting the costs 
for maintaining and operating the existing 
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freeway system to the private sector, limited 
public resources would be freed up for use on 
transportation projects off the freeway system.
The second scenario envisions a longer-
term (within 25 years) application of pricing, 
along with significant additions to freeway 
network capacity to keep up with future 
growth in travel demand.  If the short-term 
scenario were implemented first, price signals 
(i.e., higher toll rates on some segments) 
would provide an indicator of the priority 
that should be given to segments on which 
capacity additions are proposed under the long-
term scenario. Environmental studies could 
be initiated or accelerated in these corridors, 
and private partners could be sought to build, 
finance and operate the improved facilities for 
the longer term.   
In both scenarios, new fare-free express bus 
services would be introduced to complement 
congestion-based pricing. Pricing would be 
implemented on all lanes of the limited-access 
highway system, but in weekday peak periods 
only. This differs from the pricing model 
represented by SR 91, where tolls are charged 
only on the express lanes, and apply throughout 
the day and even on weekends. Under both 
FAIR highway network scenarios, no tolls 
would be charged during uncongested off-peak 
periods, because marginal costs occasioned by 
motorists when there is no congestion are equal 
to the average costs borne by them. Therefore 
tolling is unnecessary. Off-peak tolls may 
actually reduce social benefits by discouraging 
use.  
Because of the difficulty and costs involved 
in enforcing vehicle occupancy requirements 
for HOV preferences, toll exemptions would 
be provided only to authorized buses and 
vanpools, but not to other HOVs. To encourage 
ridesharing, vanpoolers and carpoolers (as well 
as transit riders) would be provided with free 
or subsidized parking at expanded park-and-
ride facilities.  The new fare-free express bus 
service and enhanced park-and-ride facilities 
would provide alternative commuting options 
for those who do not value the new time savings 
above the going toll rate under the pricing 
scenarios.
FAIR highways may generate larger social 
benefits than HOT lanes, because congestion 
would be relieved on the entire freeway instead 
of only on the premium service lanes. Because 
inexpensive and viable alternative modal choices 
will be provided, there would be little reason 
for motorists to divert to parallel free arterials 
and exacerbate congestion on them. But it will 
be more difficult to get public acceptance for 
this approach, due to a public perception that 
“existing roads have already been paid for.” 
However, the public may not be as opposed to 
new or higher tolls as is commonly believed, 
as long as commensurate benefits are provided. 
For example, focus groups conducted as part of 
the Illinois Tollway Value Pricing Study, which 
covered the several existing toll facilities in the 
Chicago area, found that about half of all users 
of the tollway system would pay at least twice 
as much for a free-flowing commute (Resource 
Systems Group 2003).  
FAIR HIGHWAY NETWORK TOLL 
REVENUE 
The two FAIR network-pricing scenarios 
were examined to evaluate their potential for 
financial self-sufficiency. The Washington, D.C., 
metropolitan area, which has a population 
in excess of four million, was used as the 
prototype for the analysis. The Washington, 
D.C., metropolitan freeway network consists 
of approximately 2,040 lane miles (Texas 
Transportation Institute 2005), or about 300 
route miles.  As population and travel demand 
increase in the longer-term future (25 years), 
freeway traffic is forecasted to increase by about 
1.5% per year. To keep up with this growth, the 
long-term scenario envisions the addition of the 
equivalent of 600 new freeway lane miles by 
widening existing facilities.
In 2003, the average daily congested 
travel period in major U.S. metropolitan areas 
amounted to about six and one-half hours, and 
the share of daily travel subjected to congested 
roadway conditions amounted to about 40% 
(Texas Transportation Institute 2005). The 
Washington, D.C., metropolitan area is even more 
congested. However, the prototypical freeway 
network used in the analysis was assumed to 
have only six hours of congestion, and 33% 
of daily freeway travel was assumed to occur 
in congested conditions in the six-hour peak 
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period that would warrant the use of pricing to 
manage demand. These lower estimates were 
used to ensure a conservative estimate of tolled 
traffic and therefore revenue.    
Table 2 provides estimates of vehicle miles 
of travel (VMT) that would be subjected to tolls 
in the two FAIR highway network scenarios, 
based on the following:
•	 Total current daily freeway vehicle miles 
of travel (VMT) amounts to 37.8 million 
(Texas Transportation Institute 2005). 
Over the long-term (i.e., 25 years), without 
pricing, an increase in freeway VMT of 
37.5% is forecasted, i.e., 1.5% per year on 
average.
•	 Thirty-three percent of daily freeway travel 
is currently congested, and 40% would be 
subjected to congested conditions in the 
long-term. 
•	 Ten percent of peak period VMT is truck 
VMT.
•	 Peak period freeway VMT would be 
reduced by 10% on congested segments 
due to the effect of tolls and complementary 
new transit and HOV services.  
While the forecasted reduction in VMT 
with pricing appears to be low, it should be 
noted that the Highway Capacity Manual 
(Transportation Research Board 2000) indicates 
that a freeway remains free flowing and 
uncongested until about 90% of its maximum 
possible traffic volume is achieved.  Thus, 
currently congested freeways need a reduction 
of just 10% of their traffic volumes for free-
flowing traffic to be restored. Drivers in the 
Washington, DC, metropolitan area notice this 
phenomenon in August every year when peak 
period traffic is reduced by only small amounts 
because of some commuters are on vacation. 
Californians observe it on days when only state 
government employees are off work because of 
a state holiday (Wachs 2003). In such situations, 
Short-term
(Scenario 1)
Long-term
(Scenario 2)
Region-wide daily highway VMT (‘000)
Total daily freeway VMT (from FHWA’s Highway Statistics) 37,815 51,996
Percent of freeway VMT that is subjected to congestions 33% 40%
Daily freeway VMT subjected to congestion 12,479 20,798
Estimated percent VMT reduction due to pricing 10% 10%
Estimated freeway VMT that will be tolled 11,231 18,718
Percent VMT by trucks in peak periods on freeways 10% 10%
Tolled VMT by trucks in peak periods on freeways 1,123 1,872
Tolled VMT by passenger vehicles in peak periods on freeways 10,108 16,847
Estimate of Toll Revenue (‘000)
Estimate to toll rate per mile for trucks $0.40 $0.55
Estimate of toll rate per mile for passenger cars $15 $0.20
Daily toll revenue from trucks $449 $1,030
Daily toll revenue from passenger cars $1,516 $3,369
Daily toll revenue total $1,965 $4,399
Number of days tolling is in effect 250 250
Annual toll revenue $491,359 $1,099,707
Table 2: Revenue Estimation for Region-wide Pricing
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there is not sufficient time for “equilibrium” 
with regard to traffic congestion to be restored, 
i.e., people who previously changed their 
mode, route, or time of travel choice because 
of congestion do not immediately get back on 
the highways during the peak periods to take 
advantage of the reduced congestion.  
With other forms of travel-demand 
management that might theoretically reduce 
traffic by 10%, such as prohibiting trucks from 
using of freeways during peak periods, a large 
portion of the traffic returns and re-congests the 
freeway. This is because of the phenomenon of 
“triple convergence,” i.e., demand attracted to 
the freeway from other routes, other modes and 
other times of the day due to improved freeway 
travel times (Downs 1990).  Unlike other 
demand management strategies, pricing keeps 
induced traffic from materializing by increasing 
the monetary cost to the motorist at the same 
time that travel time “cost” is reduced.
Any increase in bus or vanpool VMT will 
be relatively small.  They have been ignored in 
this illustrative analysis because they will be 
exempt from tolls. For Scenario 1, average peak 
charges per mile to ensure free-flowing traffic 
conditions on currently congested limited-
access highway segments are conservatively 
estimated at about 40 cents for trucks and 
about 15 cents for passenger cars, based on the 
following rationale.
•	 Average peak period tolls on the SR 91 
express lanes amount to about 40 cents 
per mile, based on the current toll schedule 
(Orange County Transportation Authority 
2005).  Tolls are charged on only four of 
12 lanes (i.e., two of six in each direction). 
If all 12 lanes of SR 91 were to be tolled in 
peak periods at levels to assure free flow of 
traffic (as are the four express lanes), the 
supply of “express” lanes would increase 
three-fold. Average peak period tolls per 
mile for passenger cars would likely be 
reduced to about one-half of the current 
toll rate, or about 20 cents per mile. This is 
based on the assumption that the minimum 
value of time of newly tolled SR 91 drivers 
would be at least half of the minimum 
value of time revealed by willingness-to-
pay of those using the four express lanes 
currently.   
•	 Because SR 91 is a relatively more severely 
congested facility, the average peak period 
toll per mile for an “average” congested 
facility may be somewhat lower. This is 
estimated at 15 cents per mile, i.e., 25% 
lower than that estimated for SR 91. 
•	 Since a heavy truck on average consumes 
two to three times the lane capacity of an 
automobile in free-flowing traffic, tolls 
for trucks would need to be about 2 to 3 
times the toll for passenger cars, or about 
40 cents per mile.
For Scenario 2, it is assumed that growth in 
real incomes over the next 25-years will increase 
motorists’ willingness to pay tolls.  Therefore, 
an average passenger car toll of 20 cents per 
mile and an average truck toll of 55 cents per 
mile (in 2005 dollars) is assumed. Revenue from 
tolled traffic shown in the lower part of Table 2 
is estimated by multiplying traffic that would be 
subjected to tolls by the respective average toll 
rates for passenger vehicles and trucks.  Assume 
that an average 10-mile peak period trip on the 
freeway is subjected to congestion on 6.7 miles 
(i.e., two-thirds of its freeway trip length). Then, 
the average peak period toll per trip would 
be $1 for passenger cars and $2.70 for trucks 
under Scenario 1, and $1.35 and $3.70 under 
Scenario 2. Annual revenues were estimated by 
assuming the pricing schemes would operate on 
250 working weekdays each year.  
FAIR HIGHWAY NETWORK COSTS 
As with revenue estimates in the previous 
section, all cost estimates are in 2005 dollars. 
Annualized costs for freeway infrastructure 
maintenance, including periodic resurfacing, are 
estimated at about $50,000 per lane mile (2005 
dollars) based on data used in the Highway 
Economic Requirements System (HERS) model 
(U.S. Department of Transportation 2000), 
resulting in a total cost of $102 million per 
year for Scenario 1 and $132 million per year 
for Scenario 2.  For Scenario 2, lane addition 
costs are estimated at $5.4 billion, based on 
an average cost of $9 million per lane mile 
(in 2005 dollars) for urban freeway capacity 
additions (U.S. Department of Transportation 
2000). Annualized at a 7% discount rate over a 
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30-year period, this amounts to $437.4 million 
per year.  
Estimates of other annualized costs for 
the FAIR highway network scenarios for 
the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area are 
presented in Tables 3, 4 and 5.  They include 
capital and operating costs for region-
wide highway network tolling and traffic 
management, for express bus service, and for 
park-and-ride facilities.  
Capital and operating costs for region-
wide highway network tolling and traffic 
management shown in Table 3 were estimated 
based on the following:
•	 Tolls would be charged only on the formerly 
congested freeway segments. Tolls would 
be charged, on average, over 6.7 miles 
of each freeway trip. This is two-thirds 
of an average 10-mile freeway commute 
trip length, based on peak period freeway 
traffic amounting to 50% of daily traffic, 
and the 33% of daily traffic estimated to be 
traveling under congested conditions.
•	 Average costs for toll collection are 
estimated at 10 cents per trip, based on 
an estimate of 5 to 10 cents per trip by 
ITS Decision, Service and Technologies 
(2005). Because toll collection costs will 
Short-term
(Scenario 1)
Long-term
(Scenario 2)
Operating Costs
Estimated daily freeway VMT that will be tolled (‘000) 11,231 18,718
Average length of trip that will be subjected to tolling (mi.) 6.7 6.7
Number of trips tolled daily (‘000) 1,676 2,794
Number of days tolling is in effect 250 250
Number of trips tolled annually (millions) 419 698
Toll collection cost per trip $0.100 $0.100
Traffic management cost per trip $0.115 $0.115
Total traffic mgmt. and toll collection cost per trip $0.215 $0.215
Annual operation costs (million $) $90.100 $150.166
Capital Costs
Number of congested lane miles that will be tolled 1,200 1,800
Number of lane charging points 400 600
Capital cost per lane charging pint $69,500 $69,500
Capital cost for all lane charging points (million $) $27.80 $41.70
Video tolling, ETC, communications system capital costs and 
miscellaneous start-up costs (million $)
$16.80 $16.80
Capital costs for mainline gantries and operations building 
(million $)
$27.50 $27.50
Total capital costs (million $) $72.10 $86.00
Annualized capital costs (million $) $6.78 $8.08
Annualized capital plus operating cost $96.88 $158.25
Table 3: Tolling and Traffic Management Costs
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decrease with large-scale implementation, 
this is a conservative estimate.
•	 Annual costs for traffic management and 
toll collection on the dynamically priced I-
15 HOT facility in San Diego were about 
$0.7 million in fiscal year 2005 (source: 
I-15 FasTrak budget and expenditure data 
for FY 2005).  The facility carried about 
5 million vehicles during that year, about 
75% of them non-tolled HOVs and the 
remaining 25% tolled vehicles. Subtracting 
costs for tolling the tolled vehicles (at 10 
cents per trip), traffic management costs 
for the year are estimated at $575,000, or 
11.5 cents per vehicle served. 
•	 Estimates for toll collection capital costs 
are based on cost data for open-road tolling 
provided by Wilbur Smith & Associates 
(source: personal e-mail communication 
dated October 28, 2003). It is assumed 
that toll-charging points will be located 
at approximately 3-mile intervals along 
1,200 lane miles of congested highway 
segments, resulting in the need for 400 
lane-charging points.  Capital costs per lane 
charging point are estimated at $46,000 for 
electronic toll collection (ETC) costs and 
$23,500 for video enforcement system 
(VES) costs, or a total of $69,500 per lane 
charging point. Video tolling hardware 
and software, ETC equipment, system 
software, communications system, other 
equipment, and miscellaneous installation, 
project management and training costs are 
estimated at $16.8 million. Mainline gantry 
costs are estimated at $25 million, and 
operations building costs at $2.5 million. 
Capital costs were annualized assuming a 
30-year life and a 7% discount rate.
Capital and operating costs for express bus 
service shown in Table 4 were estimated based 
on the following:
•	 The express bus system would have the 
capability to carry all travelers who might 
possibly shift from driving on the freeway, 
i.e., those travelers accounting for the entire 
10% of peak period freeway demand that is 
reduced. While it is expected that travelers 
may also shift to carpools or other modes, 
this will guarantee that the estimated costs 
are conservative, i.e., that they account for 
a system that is capable of carrying the 
maximum possible demand.    
•	 These new transit trip-makers would 
previously have traveled an average of 
6.7 miles each on the congested freeway 
segments now subjected to tolls.   
•	 Operating cost per new express bus 
passenger trip are estimated at $2.40, based 
on the following:
o	 Seattle, WA, bus operating costs are 
estimated at $90 per revenue hour 
(McDonald 2003).   Due to the higher 
labor costs for split shifts and use 
of part-time labor for peak period 
service, costs for a typical express bus 
network are estimated to be from 1% 
to 10% higher than for conventional 
operations (Charles River Associates 
2001), or a maximum of about $100 
per revenue hour.  
o	 Average speed of an express bus 
operating on a free-flowing freeway 
would be 20 mph, including stops, 
so that a 50-passenger bus could 
provide 1,000 passenger seat-miles of 
service per hour. Assuming average 
bus occupancy of 50%, 500 passenger 
miles of service could be provided per 
bus per revenue hour.
o	 Assuming an average trip length of an 
express bus passenger trip of 12 miles, 
based on commute trip length data 
(U.S. Department of Transportation 
2005), 42 passengers could be served 
per bus per hour.
•	 Annualized capital costs per new express 
bus passenger trip are estimated at about 
$1, based on the following:
o	 A cost of about $340,000 per bus 
(American Public Transit Association 
2005) annualized assuming a 12-year 
bus life and 7% discount rate. 
o	 A cost of about $200,000 per bus for 
indoor maintenance and storage facilities 
(American Public Transit Association 
2005), annualized assuming a 30-year 
building life, and 7% discount rate.
o	 Each bus provides an average of six 
hours of revenue service per day.
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Short-term
(Scenario 1)
Long-term
(Scenario 2)
Operating Costs
Daily freeway VMT subjected to congestion (‘000) 12,479 20,798
Estimated percent VMT reduction due to pricing 10% 10%
Daily congested VMT reduced by those shifted from freeway 
driving (‘000)
1,248 2,080
Prior average vehicle occupancy assumed for these trips 1.00 1.00
Daily congested person miles of travel (PMT) reduced (‘000) 1,248 2,080
Average length of trip that was subjected to congestion (mi.) 6.7 6.7
Number of daily trips shifted from freeway driving (‘000) 186 310
Estimated max. number of new daily transit trips (‘000) 186 310
Estimated max. number of new annual transit trips (millions) 46.56 77.61
Estimated express bus operating cost per passenger $2.40 $2.40
Estimated annual express bus system operating cost (million $) $111.75 $186.25
Capital Costs
Number of hours of revenue service per bus daily 6 6
Number of passengers served per hour of revenue service 42 42
Number of passengers served per bus annually 63,000 63,000
Total number of buses needed to operate the system 739 1,232
Capital cost per bus (million $) $0.34 $0.34
Capital cost for all buses needed (million $) $251.29 $418.82
Annualized capital cost for all buses needed (million $) $35.68 $59.47
Capital cost per bus for maintenance and storage facilities 
(million $)
$0.20 $0.20
Capital cost for storage and maintenance facilities (million $) $147.82 $246.37
Annualized capital cost for storage and maintenance facilities $11.97 $19.96
Estimated express bus system capital cost per passenger $1.02 $1.02
Annualized capital plus operating cost $159.41 $265.68
Table 4: Costs for New Transit Service
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Note that the above costs per passenger 
trip totaling about $3.50 reflect 50% bus 
occupancy.  If the system is less successful in 
attracting transit riders (e.g., if many travelers 
found carpooling more convenient), costs per 
passenger trip would rise, but overall system 
costs are not expected to change significantly 
because the objective is to maintain high-
quality, frequent service. 
Capital and operating costs shown in Table 
5 for park-and-ride facilities were estimated 
based on the following:
•	 Eighty percent of trip-makers that shift 
from freeway driving (to either transit or 
HOV passenger modes) would need to 
park at park-and-ride facilities.  
•	 The cost for construction of a surface 
parking lot is estimated at about $2,200 
per space in 2005 dollars.  The annualized 
maintenance cost for surface parking is 
estimated $130 per space (U.S. Department 
of Transportation 1992).  
•	 For a parking garage with three levels or 
more, construction costs are estimated 
at $12,300 per space. The annualized 
maintenance cost is estimated at $250 per 
space (U.S. Department of Transportation 
1992).  
•	 Most of the new park-and-ride spaces 
will be needed in exurban or suburban 
locations.  At these locations, it is more 
likely that the public agency will own 
land within existing rights-of-way near 
interchanges or along the freeway. It may 
therefore be possible to build new park-
and-ride facilities on surface lots, adjacent 
to express bus stations. It is assumed 
that 75% of new spaces at park-and-ride 
lots will use surface parking on existing 
highway rights-of-way and the rest will be 
in multi-story parking garages.  
•	 Capital costs are annualized assuming a 
7% discount rate and a 30-year life.
Short-term
(Scenario 1)
Long-term
(Scenario 2)
Operating Costs
Number of new daily transit or HOV passenger trips (‘000) 186 310
Number of daily round-trips needing parking (‘000) 75 124
Annual O & M cost per space for surface parking $130.00 $130.00
Annual O & M cost per space for multi-story parking $250.00 $250.00
Average annual O & M cost per space $160.00 $160.00
Total annual O & M cost (million $) $11.92 $19.87
Capital Costs
Capital cost per space for surface parking $2,200.00 $2,200.00
Capital cost per space for multi-story parking $12,300.00 $12,300.00
Average capital cost per space $4,725.00 $4,725.00
Total capital cost (million $) $352.02 $586.70
Annualized capital cost (million $) $28.51 $47.52
Annualized capital plus operating cost (million $) $40.43 $67.39
Table 5: Costs for Parking at Park-and-Ride Facilities
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SELF-FINANCING POTENTIAL FOR 
REGION-WIDE PRICING SCENARIOS 
Annualized costs and revenues for the two 
scenarios are summarized in Table 6. A 
comparison of revenues to costs suggests 
that, for both scenarios, annual toll revenues 
will be adequate to pay for annualized costs 
for highway services as well as transit and 
park-and-ride services. This suggests that self-
financing PPP arrangements may be feasible for 
both scenarios. The CRAST model may be used 
to develop agreements with private partners 
to design, build and operate segments of the 
system for the long-term scenario. For the short-
term scenario, under which capital investments 
would be small, partners could be sought for 
contracts to operate larger parts of the regional 
network, e.g., the Virginia, Maryland and 
District of Columbia sub-networks.  The TUP 
and HUP models could be used with private 
partners to operate the transit and park-and-ride 
facility components under both scenarios.  
In the longer-term, as infra-red camera 
technology for counting vehicle occupants is 
further developed, it may be possible to base 
shadow toll rates on the number of persons 
(instead of vehicles) provided with free flow 
travel speeds on the system. The private partners 
operating the highway system would then have 
a further incentive to strive towards the public 
goal of maximizing person mobility and system 
person throughput, within the constraints of 
existing limited freeway rights-of-way. 
Even after private contractor costs are 
paid for, the analysis in Table 6 suggests that, 
for Scenario 1, there will be a large surplus of 
revenue. Since the Scenario 2 analysis suggests 
Short-term
(Scenario 1)
Long-term
(Scenario 2)
Capital costs for lane additions $0.0 $437.4
Freeway maintenance costs $102.0 $132.0
Capital costs for toll collection/traffic management $6.8 $8.1
Operations cost for toll collection/traffic management $90.1 $150.2
Highway cost subtotal $198.9 $727.7
Estimated shadow toll per VMT $0.07 $0.16
Toll Revenues $491.4 $1,099.7
Surplus after shadow toll payments $292.5 $372.1
Express bus service cost $159.4 $265.7
Cost of parking for transit and HOV users $40.4 $67.4
Transit/HOV cost subtotal $199.8 $333.1
Total multimodal annual costs $398.7 $1,060.7
Surplus after multimodal payments $92.6 $39.0
Potential fuel tax refunds
Fuel tax per gallon (2005 dollars $0.40 $0.30
Avg. highway fuel efficiency with free flow (mpg) 30.0 40.0
Fuel tax payments of tolled VMT (million $) $37.44 $35.10
Table 6: Annualized Costs and Revenues (million $)
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that its stream of toll revenue will be adequate 
to pay for all new multimodal services, surplus 
revenue under Scenario 1 could provide a 
source of funding for new investments in 
highway or transit services off the freeway 
system to benefit freeway corridor users, such 
as; (a) traffic management and improvements 
on parallel arterials which could reduce freeway 
demand and, therefore, the going toll rates; (b) 
improvements to arterials used for access to 
the freeway system; or (c) improvements to 
ways of accessing express bus stations, such 
as improved shuttle, carsharing or taxi-sharing 
services, or improvements to pedestrian and 
bicycle facilities.  (This, again, would help keep 
rush hour toll rates low by making transit more 
attractive and therefore, reducing the demand 
for freeway driving.) 
Some or all of the surpluses could 
alternatively be refunded to motorists in the 
form of rebates on fixed auto-related charges 
such as vehicle registration fees or drivers 
license fees.  The bottom line of Table 6 
suggests that fuel taxes paid by vehicles driving 
on tolled segments of the system could be 
refunded to motorists from the surpluses. This 
could reduce “double taxation” concerns, i.e., 
the public perception that tolls are a second tax 
for use of the same facility. This may increase 
the acceptability of new tolls.  
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The new public-private partnership approach 
developed in this paper can facilitate private 
involvement in the delivery of integrated 
roadway pricing and transit/HOV systems in 
metropolitan areas.  The approach employs 
outcome-based contracting systems and 
incorporates financial incentives to maximize 
public mobility goals, with clear performance 
standards to ensure service quality. It addresses 
issues relating to unfettered private sector 
monopoly power as well as private sector 
concerns about revenue risk from possible future 
public agency actions to enhance competing 
alternatives to the tolled facility.
To evaluate financial self-sufficiency of 
a region-wide application of the concept, two 
region-wide pricing scenarios were assessed 
at a sketch level of analysis – a short-term 
scenario involving pricing all existing lanes on 
the limited access highway system and a long-
term scenario involving addition of capacity at 
the most critical locations on the limited-access 
highway system.  The results of the analysis 
suggest that both scenarios would generate 
new toll revenue sufficient to pay for all capital 
and operating costs, including costs for traffic 
management and toll operations, new fare-free 
express bus service, new park-and-ride facilities 
and freeway maintenance, and costs for new 
lanes under the long-term scenario. These 
results are dependent on several simplifying 
assumptions that were made to estimate costs 
and revenues.  More detailed analysis will be 
needed to verify them in specific metropolitan 
areas.
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